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At the present time there is hardly any question in biology of more 
importance than this of the nature and causes of variability 
(Charles Darwin, 1880)2 
 
In cultural studies biology tends to be viewed as deterministic, bearing little relation 
to environmental factors. In this article I argue that this was not necessarily so for 
the Victorians, but that reductive thought and practice which emphasised 
determinism developed in the second half of the nineteenth century in response to a 
number of social and scientific factors. Separating organism from environment, it 
focused on a biology divorced from social and historical context and was informed 
by rising concern over urban poverty, degeneration, and imperial rivalries and by a 
newly professionalised and institutionalised science. I argue that in rejecting biology 
as deterministic and emphasising fluidity, postgenomic biology recapitulates a 
Victorian insight. 
 Reductionism in science, much like reductionism outside science, simplifies. 
It can be ontological, epistemological, and methodological. In science it is often a 
powerful and necessary method which seeks to isolate and control phenomena in 
order to explain them.3 But it can fall into ideology, especially in the context of 
human behaviour. Stumbling at complexity, it may seek to explain higher-level 
processes (e.g., adaptation, adultery or addiction) by lower-level processes (e.g. 
heredity, molecular biology, genes), or seek to bring essentialist concepts (e.g. 
biological sex) to indeterminate social processes (e.g. map reading).4 Reductionism, 
as method or as ideology, and sometimes as both, seeks to explain the complex, the 
whole, or the interactive or dynamic according to the simple, the part, or the linear 
or unidirectional. Reductionism is usually deterministic, allowing little possibility 
for individual agency or choice. Where, exceptionally, determinism acknowledges 
complexity, or competing or converging causes, and does not seek to explain the 
higher by lower, complex by simple, it is not inherently reductive. In The Disorder 
of Things (1993) John Dupré observes the connections between reductionism, 
determinism and essentialism as the three pillars of conventional classification, 
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pointing out that contexts which affect perceptions of causal relations and essences 
are provided by the goals of an investigation.5 Dupré argues that reductive 
explanation can account for how things of a certain kind do what they do, but does 
not usually help to explain or predict what a complex thing will do (106).  
 The debates surrounding biological reductionism are wide ranging and where 
they relate to questions of individual freedom, race or gender they have ethical 
implications. The historical roots of reductionism can be seen in late nineteenth-
century nature/nurture debates and in interpretations of Darwin. Victorians such as 
Darwin, G. H. Lewes, George Eliot and Thomas Hardy appreciated the close 
relations between organism and environment and valued the complexities of the 
natural world. They share ground with postgenomic science which emphasises the 
dynamic relations between world and organism, questioning traditional boundaries, 
rejecting essentialism, and asking new questions about what constitutes an 
organism.6 Neo-Darwinism was coined as a negative term by the zoologist George 
Romanes - a close follower of Darwin - in Darwin and After Darwin, which 
appeared in three volumes in the 1890s. He used it to signal the departure from 
Darwin’s views of the German zoologist August Weismann. In the Contemporary 
Review he acknowledged necessary limits to Darwinian ideas: ‘mechanical the 
Darwinian theory unquestionably is [...] and the reason why it is mechanical is 
because it seeks to explain biological phenomena by natural causes’ and emphasised 
complexity: ‘[w]hen, for instance, we speak of "heredity" as a cause, what we mean 
is that in the complex and obscure physiology of generation there are a number of 
unknown causes at work’.7 Through the twentieth century Neo-Darwinism invented 
its own story, extending a pervasively deterministic world deep into microbiology 
and most recently finding expression in literary studies as a gene-intensive, literary 
Darwinism. In The Literary Animal (2005) Joseph Carroll offers a reading of Pride 
and Prejudice centred on ‘resources and reproduction’, arguing that the ultimate 
regulative principle is ‘inclusive fitness, the transmission of genes’.8 Carroll argues 
that ‘Darwinian criticism’ can avoid ‘the often false reductions in the postmodern 
conceptions of human nature’ (103), but he does not address its own reductions. 
Literary Darwinism acknowledges some environmental influence but argues overall 
for deep unchanging biological imperatives, finding little scope for the cultural 
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specificity of roles, and claiming that literary theory fails to take account of 
elemental biological motives and governing principles.9 It counters approaches over 
the last three decades that explore what Gillian Beer has called the ‘two-way’ traffic 
between science and literature.10 In Darwin’s Plots Beer argues that ‘discourse can 
never be expunged from scientific enquiry’,11 but for the Neo-Darwinians discourse 
and representation are subordinated to genes, narratives are underpinned by 
reproductive drives. In his foreword to The Literary Animal the biologist E. O. 
Wilson refers to ‘the dictates of our genes’ (25) and argues that narrative is 
deterministic, a cultural expression of the genetic. 
The mid Victorians were able to avoid opposition between environment and 
biology. Lewes remarked in ‘Mr Darwin’s Hypothesis’ in 1868 that ‘by "conditions" 
we are not to understand geographical or climatal influences simply, or even mainly; 
but the whole group of conditions, external and internal, physical, organic, and 
social, which determine the result.’12 This sense of complexity is at odds with post-
Weismann and early eugenist views as well as with more recent neo-Darwinian 
ideas. Awareness of complexity could, however, co-exist with reductive approaches 
that fitted the new institutionalised contexts; these approaches did not deny the 
impact of the environment but sought to exclude it in experimentation. The 
emphasis in postgenomic science on complexity and on a synthesis of nature and 
nurture is part of a wider resistance, perhaps, to anxieties that the human genome 
project would reduce life to a series of coding sequences, and to concerns over the 
potential of genetics for control.13 These ideas are not in themselves new: microbial 
genetics developed as an area of experimental research in the 1940s and 1950s, and 
opened up new ways of thinking about biology. William Hayes, a leader in the field, 
discovered transferable genetic elements between bacteria. In his classic text book 
The Genetics of Bacteria and their Viruses (1964) he wrote ‘what is inherited is not 
the character itself but the potentiality to express it, and [...] this potentiality may be 
profoundly affected by the environment to which the organism is exposed.’14 The 
dynamic relations between organism and environment are now receiving new 
emphasis in postgenomic biology. 
 Neo-Darwinism reduces evolutionary development and culture to biological 
and deterministic principles, but somewhat paradoxically it is an idea that is now 
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more prevalent in literary studies. Molecular biology has become less reductionist 
with the new methodologies of systems biology.15 And while evolutionary biology 
has moved beyond Darwin, the more complex aspects of Darwinian thought which 
emphasise interdependence are paralleled in postgenomic thinking.16  
 Recent historical and literary scholarship focuses on the openness and the 
progressive thought of the Victorian Darwin, but highlights too the diversity and 
contrariety of Darwinian ideas. David Amigoni, Gillian Beer, Janet Browne, Adrian 
Desmond, Thomas Dixon, George Levine and James Moore together give us a 
scientist who is scientific and sympathetic, who wonders at difference, and opposes 
slavery, who thinks, in Gillian Beer’s phrase, in the third edition of Darwin’s Plots 
(2009, 242), about ‘the consciousness of others’ across all forms of organic life. 
Darwin offers new ways of thinking about scale, about chance, about intimate 
interrelatedness. He provides models for observing the natural world, giving us 
narratives of growth and profusion, of thinking about telos, and progress.  
 But the Darwin celebrations of 2009 were, overall, less historically engaged. 
Steven Shapin observes that the events, focused on Darwin and his perceived 
present implications, marginalised the historical, taking Darwin out of his 
intellectual and social context and reinforcing myths.17 Perhaps a focus - however 
non-reductive - on one scientist risks reductive effects, tending to reinforce single 
explanations and detracting from wider social and cultural influences. Of recent 
biographies, Janet Browne’s Charles Darwin: Voyaging (1995) and Charles 
Darwin: The Power of Place (2002) go furthest in detailing the world in which 
Darwin was writing, providing a complex account of his life and work by focusing 
on friendship, family, and social networks as scientific arenas, and the Cambridge 
Darwin Correspondence Project offers invaluable insight into these networks. 
 
I 
Questions 
 
The Origin of Species is expansive and unsettling. Birds sing in the bushes of an 
entangled bank, insects flit about, and worms crawl through the damp earth. ‘It is 
interesting’, Darwin writes, with both measure and wonder, that ‘these elaborately 
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constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so 
complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us’.18 Darwin 
gives as these laws: 
Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by 
reproduction; Variability from the indirect and direct action of the 
external conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio of Increase 
so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural 
Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-
improved forms (489-90). 
There is a stress on environment, on extrinsic causes. Inheritance is ‘almost implied 
by reproduction’, but nonetheless listed in its own right. The tentative distinction 
between the two reflects both an uncertainty but also an acknowledgement of its 
necessity. Inheritance was elusive. It didn’t map entirely onto the process of 
reproduction.  
 Darwin’s gaze was meticulous and scrutinising but for all its observation it 
was not without some of the biases of his contemporaries, accepting and working 
within conventional racial hierarchies. This drive to understand and explain 
everything might be seen as reductionist, at least methodologically, resonant at times 
with Casaubon’s will to find the key to all mythologies in Middlemarch. But Darwin 
remained open and speculative, in contrast to the approach emerging in a 
developing, institutionalized, science. He introduced greater complexity into his 
work subsequent to the Origin, seeking explanations that did not depend on natural 
selection, and giving new attention to sexual selection which returns agency and 
choice to individuals acting in social groups. And the scrutinising gaze is tempered, 
countered, even, by a sense of wonder and eccentric curiosity which tends to 
disallow ideology. Earthworms at Down House were whistled at, the children played 
them music and Darwin shouted at them, to see if they could hear. Darwin records in 
his last publication: ‘They were indifferent to shouts, if care was taken that the 
breath did not strike them. When placed on a table close to the keys of a piano, 
which was played as loudly as possible, they remained perfectly quiet.’19 Darwin’s 
fascination with the world, with environment - with, in one instance, the ‘experience 
of the plants in pots’20 - continued. In The Formation of Vegetable Mould (1881) he 
remarked, ‘It may be doubted whether there are many other animals which have 
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played so important a part in the history of the world, as have these lowly organised 
creatures’.21 The idea surprises, and recognises extensive relations between 
organism and environment. 
 Darwin asks questions, contemplates with interest, aware that the world will 
not yield itself fully for analysis. As complex life forms come into the world, he 
remarks, ‘this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity’ 
(Origin, 490); here, gravity is contrasted with the multitude of variables which lead 
to biological development. The world Darwin gives us is characterised by chance 
complexity.  
 
II 
Responses 
 
Darwin’s work was taken in various and contradictory directions by his readers. Sir 
John Herschel, mathematician, astronomer, chemist and philosopher, referred to 
natural selection as the ‘law of higgledy-piggledy’22 and the Cambridge Professor of 
Geology Adam Sedgwick famously wrote to him: ‘There is a moral or metaphysical 
part of nature as well as a physical [...] You have ignored this link; &, if I do not 
mistake your meaning, you have done your best in one or two pregnant cases to 
break it.’23 
 However, the Reverend and writer Charles Kingsley wrote to Darwin in the 
same month: 
I have gradually learnt to see that it is just as noble a conception of 
Deity, to believe that he created primal forms capable of self 
development into all forms needful pro tempore & pro loco, as to believe 
that He required a fresh act of inter-vention to supply the lacunas wh. he 
himself had made. I question whether the former be not the loftier 
thought.24 
 Reading the Origin, George Eliot wrote to Barbara Bodichon: ‘to me the 
Development Theory and all other explanations of processes by which things came 
to be, produce a feeble impression compared with the mystery that lies under the 
processes’,25 and G. H. Lewes remarked two decades later: 
Sentiment is shocked at the attempt to explain Nature on mechanical 
principles only, and is sustained by Common Sense, which sees other 
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facts besides facts of motion, and sees that Nature is not mechanical 
only. [...] When the moral impulse to cherish the weak and sickly is 
condemned because Nature (which is not moral) cherishes the strong and 
pitilessly destroys the weak, Common Sense protests, and the protest 
helps to intensify the popular distrust of Science.26  
 
 But, as Lewes noted, mechanistic thinking was neither exclusive to nor 
uniform in science: ‘the wiser heads among men of science are equally alive to the 
mistakes of such applications’ (413). In The Descent of Man, Darwin suggested it 
was both possible and desirable to improve the health of the nation through 
controlled breeding: ‘excepting in the case of man himself, hardly any one is so 
ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed’, but he immediately countered this: 
‘Nor could we check our sympathy, if so urged by hard reason, without deterioration 
in the noblest part of our nature’. Sympathy, human nobility, stood in the way of 
reductionism.27 
 The social implications of Darwin tended in various directions, pointing 
further to competing aspects in his work but also suggesting ways in which 
interpretation of his ideas, ranging from the ennobling to the mechanistic, can be 
contingent on beliefs and social and political values. His cousin Francis Galton 
developed the idea of eugenics for ‘improving stock’ in humans, arguing this was 
‘practical Darwinism’, while for the exiled Russian biologist Peter Kropotkin 
Darwin’s ideas led to mutual aid; co-operation throughout the plant and animal 
world. 28 Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, which collected his essays 
from the 1890s in the Nineteenth Century, appeared in 1902. In the early twentieth 
century hereditarians divided into biometricians and Mendelians. The Cambridge 
biologist William Bateson rapidly became the leading British Mendelian, coining 
the term ‘genetics’ which, he said in 1906, ‘would sufficiently indicate that our 
labours are devoted to the elucidation of the phenomena of heredity and variation 
[...] after more or less undirected wanderings, we have thus a definite aim in view.29 
As historians and sociologists have noted, Bateson dismissed aspects of Darwinism, 
referring to ‘the utilitarian view of the building up of Species’ in his Materials for 
the Study of Variation (1894), which rejected the role of natural selection in 
producing variation.30 He also opposed Weismann’s theory. While the 
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biometricians, headed by Karl Pearson and W. F. R. Weldon, acknowledged that 
every individual is different and environment has to be taken into account, they dealt 
with the complexity thus identified by inventing the techniques of what became 
mathematical statistics. These, they claimed, would allow reliable predictions of the 
characteristics of populations of individuals and hence expert control of society and 
its members. Challenging reductionist statistical theories, Bateson deployed 
Mendelism to oppose this sort of scientism.31 He disliked the narrowly middle-class 
values of the eugenics movement, and feared that its success might lead to the 
further success of utilitarian rationalisation and modernisation.32 
 
III 
Uncertainties 
 
In 1880 Darwin wrote a preface to a collection of essays on descent by the German 
zoologist August Weismann, flagging up uncertainty around questions of inheritance 
and environment: 
Several distinguished naturalists maintain with much confidence that 
organic beings tend to vary and to rise in the scale, independently of the 
conditions to which they and their progenitors have been exposed; whilst 
others maintain that all variation is due to such exposure, though the 
manner in which the environment acts is as yet quite unknown. At the 
present time there is hardly any question in biology of more importance 
than this of the nature and causes of variability. (vi) 
 
While Weismann’s ideas lent themselves to a shift towards hard-line hereditarian 
thought, Weismann himself was aware that organisms were extremely complex and 
that their environment profoundly affected them and their capacity to survive. His 
thinking in relation to inheritance was structured by a reductive approach at a time 
when science was rapidly professionalising and specialising and thought was 
increasingly linked to occupational roles, situations and practices. Frank Turner 
notes that in the later nineteenth century the professionalising efforts of the young 
guard of scientists who championed the empirical method - relying on observation 
and experiment - and claimed it as ‘the exclusive foundation for legitimate science’ 
was led ‘to undermine the intellectual legitimacy of alternative modes of scientific 
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thought and practice’. 33 It was in part under these new conditions that emphasis was 
refocused on the organism itself; specialisation would be likely to lead to partial 
sightedness. Sometimes, this was a partial sightedness that was fully aware of the 
wider picture, but questions were closed down by a newly professionalised context. 
The developing laboratory and new technologies of observation and experiment 
limited the questions and connections that can be investigated with precision.34  
 Awareness of complexity could co-exist with narrowed and reductionist 
thinking in the more limited purview of a new, strongly bounded professional 
context. Weismann wrote of heredity: ‘The great complexity of the subject has alone 
rendered it hitherto insuperable’ noting that ‘we certainly have not reached the limits 
of attainable knowledge’, and it was complexity that Darwin chose to focus on in his 
preface to Weismann’s essays.35 In his later essay ‘Remarks on Certain Problems of 
the Day’, Weismann pointed out that his thoughts on heredity were not final but 
were to serve ‘as a starting-point for further thought’ (II, 82). He drew an analogy 
between the question of heredity and ‘certain anatomical and physiological 
problems, e.g., the structure and function of the human brain. Its structure - with so 
many millions of nerve-fibres and nerve-cells - is of such extraordinary complexity 
that we might well despair of ever completely understanding it’ and argued that as 
knowledge here might be advanced by investigating the nervous systems in lower 
forms: ‘we should not abandon the hope of arriving at a satisfactory knowledge of 
the processes of heredity, if we consider the simplest processes of the lower animals 
as well as the more complex processes met with in the higher forms’ (71-2). This 
assumption that the simple might provide unproblematic insight into the complex 
tends to reductionist thinking.  
 Darwin, working independently at Down House, was able to stay with 
questions, remarking in the Origin: ‘The laws governing inheritance are quite 
unknown; no one can say why the same peculiarity in different individuals of the 
same species, and in individuals of different species, is sometimes inherited and 
sometimes not’ (13). Professions of uncertainty would similarly abound in The 
Effects of Cross- and Self-Fertilisation in the Vegetable Kingdom (1876), Darwin’s 
meticulous write-up of eleven years of detailed research through experimentation. 
The cause of variation is both vital and elusive. The Origin, G. H. Lewes remarked, 
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was ‘the product of an immense series of tentative gropings [...] the product of long-
continued though baffled research’.36  Laws of heredity perplex George Eliot’s Mr 
Tulliver in The Mill on the Floss: ‘a pleasant sort o’ soft woman may go on breeding 
you stupid lads and ’cute wenches, till it’s as if the world was turned topsy-turvy. 
It’s an uncommon puzzlin’ thing’.37 The suggestion that somehow heredity ought to 
be more straightforward seems here suspect, almost nonsensical.  
  
IV 
Organism and Environment 
 
Darwin’s science had greater affinity with the Victorian novelist, both in terms of 
method and ethos, than with a late nineteenth-century German laboratory researcher 
such as Weismann. In 1853, in his exposition of Comte, who he held to be ‘the 
greatest thinker of modern times’, Lewes wrote 
if Bichat had only steadily considered the indispensable co-operation of 
the medium (or surrounding circumstances in which an organization is 
placed) with the organization itself [...] he would have seen that so far 
from organic bodies being independent of external circumstances they 
became more and more dependent on them as their organization 
becomes higher.38 
He defined medium as ‘the whole of the surrounding circumstances necessary to the 
existence of the organism’. Eliot, turning over questions of inheritance and 
environment, shared this sense of the integral relationship between organism and 
environment. In ‘The Natural History of German Life’, her review of the first two 
parts of W. H. Riehl’s Naturgeschichte des Volkes in the Westminster Review, she 
emphasises the reciprocal relations between character and environment and their 
centrality to development:  
The external conditions which society has inherited from the past are but 
the manifestation of inherited internal conditions in the human beings 
who compose it; the internal conditions and the external are related to 
each other as the organism and its medium, and development can take 
place only by the gradual consentaneous development of both.39  
 The emphasis on agreement, on mutual consent between organism and 
environment, as though both are entities with choice and agency, is striking. The 
model is one of dynamic interaction: the biological and the historical inscribe each 
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other. This, Eliot argued, was ‘incarnate history’ (127, emphasis in original). Here 
was a manifesto against reductionism, for the historian, the scientist, and, implicitly, 
the novelist. Eliot emphasised that any study of ‘the natural history of our social 
classes, especially of the small shopkeepers, artisans, and peasantry’ would have to 
take into account their entire environment, including their relations with each other. 
In referring not simply to history but to natural history, she brings the present, in the 
form of interdependent living systems, to the past. Natural history was concerned 
with the whole organism, and its relation to its environment, as biology was not 
necessarily. Eliot describes a complex welter of relations and influences that 
resonates with Darwin: ‘local conditions, their maxims and habits, the points of view 
from which they regard their religious teachers [...] the interaction of the various 
classes on each other, and what are the tendencies in their position towards 
disintegration or towards development’ (112). Disintegration and development are at 
once biological and social terms. Eliot advances a form of development that is both 
natural and historical. 
 The questions Lewes and Eliot were turning over in the 1850s find 
expression in Eliot’s fiction. Middlemarch, a sustained study of organisms in their 
social medium, presents us with a twenty-seven-year-old Lydgate who is determined 
to provide the next sequence to Bichat’s work in pursuing a knowledge of living 
structure. Lewes saw Bichat as too exclusively focused on the organism, and 
Lydgate determines to go more deeply into the structure of tissue, wrongly thinking 
that he can shut out environment at will, doing ‘good small work for Middlemarch, 
and great work for the world’; he is bounded by a desire to ‘contribute towards 
enlarging the scientific, rational basis of his profession’ but his science cannot 
proceed independently of his social environment.40  
 Cusped between his nature and his environment, Lydgate’s career at this 
point is a ‘fine subject for a betting’ (140). The moment encapsulates a process 
central to novel writing. Possibility is unfixed, free will, tendency and circumstance 
are in precarious balance. Lydgate has reached a starting point ‘with all the possible 
thwartings and furtherings of circumstance, all the niceties of inward balance, by 
which a man swims and makes his point or else is carried headlong’ (140). In the 
prelude Eliot suggests an analogy between human history and science through the 
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terms ‘mixture’ and ‘experiment’, referring to ‘the history of man, and how the 
mysterious mixture behaves under the varying experiments of Time’ (3). Character 
is a ‘mysterious mixture’, fluid, unpredictable, but on the other hand Lydgate is 
marked, mottled by ‘spots of commonness’ somewhere between nature and nurture 
(141). He walks, Eliot tells us, ‘by hereditary habit’ (327). The phrase is significant, 
undercutting the sense of a determining heredity. Eliot had referred in the Mill on 
the Floss to ‘hereditary custom’ (272). Habits are not hereditary in the sense of 
being inevitable, but are somehow learned: they are ultimately chosen rather than 
given and may be thrown off.41 For Eliot, character can be delible. Character, she 
emphasises in Middlemarch, is not fixed. ‘“My dear Mrs. Casaubon” said Mr. 
Farebrother, smiling gently at her ardour, “character is not cut in marble—it is not 
something solid and unalterable. It is something living and changing”’ (692). Eliot 
was familiar with Bain’s associationist ideas, in which repeated activities left 
pathways through the mind so that character was to an extent formed 
physiologically, but her fiction advances a more fluid conception of character, in 
dynamic relation to its social medium, with habit as educable, at least as much as 
hereditary.42 
  The capacity to transform habit was under scrutiny at this time. In the same 
year as the Origin, Samuel Smiles’ Self-Help (which had originated as a series of 
lectures to the Leeds Mutual Improvement Society in 1845) appeared.  In one of 
these lectures Smiles had declared: ‘it is alleged that education would give [the 
working classes] aspirations to rise above their present position, and might endanger 
institutions now established among us, and held to be “glorious”. Welcome to all 
such aspirations!’43 The work emphasised the capacity for autonomy and self-
development, going against fixed hereditarian ideas of social hierarchy: ‘it may be 
observed how greatly the character may be strengthened and supported by the 
cultivation of good habits’.44 In Self-Help Smiles quoted Joseph Butler: ‘“As habits 
belonging to the body,” he says, “are produced by external acts, so habits of the 
mind are produced by the execution of inward practical purposes.”’45  
 These were questions with which John Stuart Mill was engaged. In his 
Autobiography (1873) he wrote: 
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In particular, I have long felt that the prevailing tendency to regard all 
the marked distinctions of human character as innate, and in the main 
indelible, and to ignore the irresistible proofs that by far the greater part 
of those differences, whether between individuals, races, or sexes, are 
such as not only might but naturally would be produced by differences in 
circumstances, is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of 
great social questions and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human 
improvement.46 
It was, he thought, a tendency ‘so agreeable to human indolence, as well as to 
conservative interests generally’, that it would need to be attacked ‘at the very root’ 
(184).  
 
V 
Relations between the sciences 
   
Eliot saw social science as comprising elements which corresponded to the ‘grand 
and simple generalizations’ of ‘mathematics and physics’ but noted that it had other 
departments which, embracing ‘the conditions of social life in all their complexity 
[...] may be called its Biology carrying us on to innumerable special phenomena 
which outlie the sphere of science, and belong to Natural History’ ('Natural History', 
130). Figured in this way, resisting reductive specialisations, biology allowed for 
observation and particularity, and a means for seeing the whole organism in its 
habitat. For Eliot, biology, with its affinity to natural history, is more than a science, 
and must be if it is to account for life: 
And just as the most thorough acquaintance with physics, or chemistry, 
or general physiology will not enable you at once to establish the 
balance of life in your private vivarium, [...] so the most complete 
equipment of theory will not enable a statesman or a political and social 
reformer to adjust his measures wisely, in the absence of a special 
acquaintance with the section of society for which he legislates [...]. In 
other words, a wise social policy must be based not simply on abstract 
social science, but on the Natural History of social bodies. (130-1) 
  Here, Eliot suggests that no single science can apprehend society, each 
may offer some light, but it is natural history that is the most illuminating. She 
draws on Comte, but also diverges from him. Comte did not see the phenomena of 
biology as outlying the boundaries of science, arguing instead that they obeyed a law 
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of higher complexity.47 Eliot resists Comte’s hierarchy of the sciences which viewed 
social science as the most complex, following on from astronomy, physics, 
chemistry, and biology, instead taking social science outside science, and turns to 
natural history to open up a space for biology and social science that allows for 
indeterminacy.  
 Lewes is illuminating here. He wrote in his exposition of Comte that ‘all 
phenomena of life [are] more complex than chemical or physical phenomenon, and 
hence less easily reduced to simple laws’ (Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences, 164). 
He went on to quote Comte: ‘if anyone will turn to the section on Organic 
Chemistry, and consider the arguments which force a repudiation of the 
encroachment of Chemistry into the proper domain of Biology, he will see how 
irresistibly they apply to this encroachment of Biology into Psychology’ (211); each 
science was limited. In Popular Science Monthly he observed that each science ‘is 
restricted to its own class of facts, none can legislate for others’.48 Eliot was 
concerned to distinguish between the sciences, pointing also to their limitations: 
‘Biology embraces phenomena which are not explicable by Chemistry; and no 
biological generalization will enable us to predict the infinite specialities produced 
by the complexity of vital conditions’ (130). The argument foreshadows Karl 
Popper’s statement, as part of a wider critique of reductionism in his Medawar 
Lecture, ‘A New Interpretation of Darwinism’ (1986), that biochemistry is not 
reducible to chemistry.49 The neurobiologist Steven Rose, in his challenge to 
reductionism, Lifelines: Biology, Freedom, Determinism, notes: ‘whatever the case 
may be for the properties of physical and chemical systems, the nature of 
evolutionary and developmental processes in biology means that there is no such 
necessary primacy [of lower orders]’ (93); ‘every level of organization of the 
universe has its own meanings, which disappear at lower levels’ (296). That which 
may appear intrinsic can usually be seen to have at least some extrinsic aspect. Rose 
argues that the new genetics has fuelled the reductionist argument of neurogenetic 
determinism which argues for a directly causal relationship between gene and 
behaviour - what has come to be seen as the ‘genes for’ idea50 - and emphasises that 
‘living systems are by definition open ones’; ‘a living organism cannot exist 
independently from its environment, with its constant interchange of energy and 
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information, threats and promises’ (95).  
 The close-knittedness of organism and environment, of insides and 
outsides, is integral to the Victorian realist novel. Characters move in a bulky social 
milieu of events, gossip, stories, and other people, very few of which are 
immediately predictable. Only the author knows what is going to happen, and he or 
she can equally decide in favour of something else happening. If character were 
fixed and determined by biology most novels would be very short, indeed there 
would likely be no need for such environmental stimuli as novels. And characters 
that are impervious to circumstance, to others, to the world around them, do not 
make for page turners. Even Emile Zola’s characters, seemingly in thrall to heredity, 
find themselves in relentless environments. Fiction at a formal level tends to present 
a challenge to the idea of character as biologically produced and determined, 
elaborately detailing conditions necessary to existence. As he prepared his novels for 
the Macmillan 1912 Wessex Edition, Hardy gave them a retrospective classification, 
designating the first and pre-eminent group, the ‘novels of character and 
environment’. The earliest of the nine works grouped in this category was Under the 
Greenwood Tree (1872); it would be another three years before Darwin first used 
the term. He wrote in the second edition of The Variation of Animals and Plants 
under Domestication (1875) ‘[I]f it profited a plant to inhabit a humid instead of an 
arid station, a fitting change in its constitution might possibly result from the direct 
action of the environment.’51 In the first edition he had referred to a plant having to 
be ‘modified so as to become fitted to inhabit’ an altered station; this was now 
reformulated, with the environment gaining a more active role.52 Herbert Spencer 
popularised the term, referring in his Principles of Psychology (1855) to ‘the 
division of the environment into two halves, soil and air’.53 The idea of environment 
entered biological discourse, having the precise meaning of influences which could 
act on and determine the development of an organism or character, and offered 
resistance to reductionist hereditarian explanations. All Hardy’s novels explore to 
varying degrees the individual unfolding in, chafing against, thriving or wilting in 
their environment. Jude the Obscure is eventually overwhelmed by his, but Donald 
Farfrae effects changes in his, and thrives. The Woodlanders, rustling with trees, 
explores implicit and explicit analogies between humans and other life forms. Grace 
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Melbury, uprooted from her environment, loses something of herself. Hardy’s 
novels of character and environment share the purview of all novels which explore 
the relation between character and world. In this way, the novelist and the 
Darwinian biologist share a common interest in external influences, including social 
relations, on the development of life.  
VI 
Eclipse of the Environment 
 
So how did we get from an enworlded sense of development to reductive neo-
Darwinism - or what Steven Rose refers to as Ultra-Darwinism - the idea of the 
organism isolated from environment? Even the British zoologist Ray Lankester, in 
the profoundly deterministic Degeneration: A Chapter in Darwinism (1880), related 
his pessimistic model of development to environment: ‘Degeneration may be 
defined as a gradual change of the structure in which the organism becomes adapted 
to less varied and less complex conditions of life [...] Any new set of conditions 
occurring to an animal which render its food and safety very easily attained, seem to 
lead as a rule to Degeneration’.54 But in the 1880s, rising concern over urban 
poverty, degeneration, and imperial rivalries, drove changing perceptions of human 
nature. Heredity came to be seen as playing a more decisive part as increasingly 
troubling social questions were displaced onto the biological. A concomitant focus 
on the organism, divorced from environmental concerns, was privileged in a new 
professional context. Weismann dismissed the effects of Lamarckian use or disuse 
and the inheritance of any acquired characteristics, delivering a dramatic challenge 
to environmental influence. Lewes had remarked of Lamarck: 
naturalists before his time had been wont to consider the Organism apart 
from the Medium in which it existed; he clearly saw that vital 
phenomena depended on the relation of the two; but in his hypothesis he 
sacrificed the one factor somewhat to the other; he paid too little regard 
to the Organism and its laws of development.55  
Darwin increasingly made use of Lamarck’s idea of acquired characteristics in 
successive issues of the Origin. Weismann’s work veered in the other direction, 
providing a resolute argument in favour of nature over nurture, and suggesting a 
decisive break with past conceptions:  
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the substance of the germ-cells [...] transfers its hereditary tendencies 
from generation to generation, at first unchanged, and always 
uninfluenced in any corresponding manner, by that which happens 
during the life of the individual which bears it [...] if these ideas [...] be 
correct, all our ideas upon the transformation of species require thorough 
modification, for the whole principle of evolution by means of exercise 
(use and disuse), as proposed by Lamarck, and accepted in some cases 
by Darwin, entirely collapses.56 
Germ-plasm – which bore the factors determining the transmission of characters – 
was apparently isolated from the body of the organism that carried it, and was 
transmitted unchanged from generation to generation. The matter which controlled 
heredity simply passed through the organism, without contributions from the 
somatic cells, and apparently impervious to environmental influence. Weismann 
declared, ‘it is impossible to imagine any way in which the transmission of changes, 
produced by the direct action of external forces upon the somatic cells, can be 
brought about’ (80). Organism and environment were cut off from each other. ‘The 
germ-plasm is the essential part of the germ-cell, and determines the nature of the 
individual that arises from it’ reported Grant Allen in the Academy.57 The role of 
culture in this narrative of evolutionary development was redundant. 
 Conditions for the reception of Weismann’s ideas were as favourable as they 
were for their production. Even Hardy records ‘dipping into’ them in 1890.58 There 
were other perspectives. Alfred Wallace, for example, developed the idea of cultural 
evolution and saw human progress as largely independent of natural selection, but 
this proved less popular.59 The degrading effects of slum life and factory work, and 
the conditions of the poor, were receiving sensational coverage in such articles as 
‘How the Poor Live’ by George Sims, which became a regular feature of The 
Pictorial World, and these fuelled fears of degeneration. The journalist and eugenist 
Arnold White, who published his first explorations of the poor in The Problems of a 
Great City (1886), wrote in Empire and Efficiency (1901) of ‘street-bred brains’ and 
‘country-born labourers in the prime of life’ becoming ‘white-faced workmen living 
in courts and alleys’. He warned that ‘the Empire will not be maintained by a nation 
of out-patients’ and that ‘the marriage of destitute and sickly minors is a fruitful 
recruiting-ground for the unfit.’60 ‘London. Four Million forlorn hopes!’ wrote 
Hardy in his diary in 1889.61 In a chapter called ‘Pathological’, in The Nether World, 
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George Gissing remarks of Clara Hewett:  
you must try to understand this girl of the people, with her unfortunate 
endowment of brains and defect of tenderness [...] like a creature that is 
beset by unrelenting forces, she summoned and surveyed all the craft 
faculties lurking in the dark places of her nature.62 
Like the characters that inhabit it, this urban world is diseased, as the chapter title 
suggests; it is biologically determined and seems incapable of improvement.63 The 
depiction of the poor in these biologistic terms continued. In Jack London’s more 
sympathetic People of the Abyss (1903), a term Wells employed in his Anticipations 
of the Reactions of Mechanical and Scientific Progress Upon Human Life and 
Thought, the poor are: ‘a new species, a breed of city savages.’64 The brutalising 
effects of poverty in cities were made unavoidably obvious. Hereditarian thought, 
which refused environmental influence, held that environment itself could be 
explained by biology. 
 Weismann shows awareness of the effects of environment, but these are 
downplayed in his laboratory experiments. 
abundant nourishment can make the body large and strong, but can never 
make a giant out of the germ-cell destined to become a dwarf. Unhealthy 
sedentary habits or insufficient nourishment makes the factory-hand pale 
and stunted; life on board ship with plenty of exercise and sea air, gives 
the sailor bodily strength and a tanned skin; but when once the 
resemblance to father or mother, or to both, is established in the germ-
cell it can never be effaced, let the habit of life be what it will (Essays 
upon Heredity, 102).  
There was resistance both within and outside the scientific community. In The 
Biological Problem of Today: Preformation or Epigenesis? (1896) the zoologist 
Oscar Hertwig referred to Weismann’s doctrine of determinants as ‘a closed system, 
finding within itself a formal explanation of all development’.65 It was, he argued 
‘an abandonment of explanation rather than an explanation; for it explains by sign 
and tokens that elude verification and experiment, and that cannot encounter 
concrete investigation’ (140). Hertwig defined epigenesis as the doctrine that the 
formation of a new individual was not simply the outgrowing of particles in the egg-
cell, but the result of ‘moulding external forces’ (143). In his introduction to 
Hertwig’s study the zoologist Peter Chalmers Mitchell wrote, ‘we are only at the 
beginning of inquiry into the problems of heredity’ (xiv).  
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 Weismann’s hard-line hereditarian approach would continue into the 
twentieth century, finding expression, for example, in The Bell Curve (1994), the 
work of the psychologist Richard J. Hernstein and the political scientist Charles 
Murray. Franz Boas, the Columbia anthropologist, mounted a sustained attack on 
eugenics and argued that IQ tests were affected by education and social and cultural 
environment, and in The Mismeasure of Man (1981) Stephen Jay Gould disputed 
E.O. Wilson’s claims that certain traits were universal in humans.66 Further 
resistance to hereditarianism from within the scientific community came from 
Barbara McClintock, the 1983 Nobel Laureate,67 and the geneticist Richard 
Lewontin, who opposes genetic determinism and its expression in sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology.68  
 
VII 
Interdependencies 
 
In 1910 Hardy, who referred to himself as one of the earlier acclaimers of the 
Origin, observed: 
Few people seem to perceive fully as yet that the most far-reaching 
consequence of the establishment of the common origin of all species, is 
ethical; that it logically involved a readjustment of altruistic morals by 
enlarging as a necessity of rightness the application of what has been 
called “The Golden Rule” beyond the area of mere mankind to that of 
the whole animal kingdom. Possibly Darwin himself did not wholly 
perceive it, though he alluded to it.69 
New research in biology emphasises intersubjectivity, not just between humans but 
between species. The biologists Frans de Waal, Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce 
demonstrate that nature can be a source of value, a network of empathy, trust, and 
reciprocity.70 Postgenomic thinking shares ground with the dynamic Darwinian 
model of interaction, arguing that organisms have a constructive role in relation to 
their environment. Postgenomic biologists working on genes and environment in 
relation to race, and who are involved in the politics of health equality, include 
Esteban González Burchard, a medical doctor specialising in genetic epidemiology, 
and Rick Kittles, who researches issues surrounding race, genetic ancestry and 
health disparities.71 Postgenomic science evidences a world that is probabilistic 
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rather than deterministic and emphasises the centrality of social relations to 
evolutionary development. John Dupré and Barry Barnes write that ‘it could still be 
that our inclination to identify the essence of ourselves with what is written in our 
genomes would greatly diminish if we chose to reflect more deeply on our social 
life’ and ‘the interaction with others in which it consists’.72  
 Popper argued for ‘active Darwinism’, which saw the living organism as 
helping to determine its own fate by modifying its environment to meet its needs, 
and Lewontin writes against one of the central concepts of neo-Darwinism, the idea 
that an organism does not influence but merely fits its environment.73 This is one of 
the most fertile questions in evolutionary biology.74 Recent research reinforces the 
idea that gene expression is influenced by early environment.75 For twenty-first-
century postgenomic biologists, life is no longer understood in terms of fixed 
taxonomies or essences, but as a dynamic world of various microbial combinations. 
The dynamic world of postgenomic biology, resonant with the interconnected world 
of the mid-Victorians, rejects the traditional dichotomy between nature and nurture, 
and recognises the centrality of cooperation to life forms (seen in its most extreme 
form in mutualistic symbiosis). Using the term ‘the politics of life’ to contrast the 
present with Foucault’s politics of health in the eighteenth century, the sociologist 
Nikolas Rose argues that contemporary biopolitics is not defined by health and 
illness, or by parameters of sexuality and procreation. He writes ‘it is a space of 
problems concerning the optimization of life itself’ and sees ways out from a causal 
relationship between geneticization and determinism, making the point that ‘to place 
something on the side of nature is no longer to place it on the side of the 
unalterable’.76 Once individuals who are genetically at risk are identified there can 
be interventions to reduce that risk (249); and interventions such as gene therapy can 
be life giving. The realisation we are all biological creatures should not, he argues, 
be a cause for critique but for optimism (254). Rose offers a challenge to the 
polarised positions of social constructionism and biological determinism. As he 
points out, there has been a seismic shift from the position of second-wave 
feminism, whereby the body was a natural object which needed to be rescued from 
medical experts, to a situation where bodies have become central to our 
expectations, hopes and identities; it is, he argues, a time of an emergent form of 
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life. We are entering a complex, confusing time, and to view as negative all 
development in genetics is analogous to opposing medical research, and misses 
some of the possibilities of humanity.  
 The historian of health sciences Dorothy Porter has recently brought the new 
conceptions of environment and organism to bear on the question of race, 
problematising claims that developments in genomic science will lead to new forms 
of social hierarchy and discrimination determined by genetic heritage.77 Charting 
ways in which the genome revolution in microbiology has led to new macro-studies 
of population genetics and the role of ancestry in understanding human disease, she 
observes the ease with which scientific investigations of race are seen as racialist 
science and as reinforcing of cultural racism78 and cautions against ill-defined uses 
of the term ‘personalized medicine’, which carries the sense of ‘designer’ health and 
other apparent expressions of the excesses of capitalist individualism; Porter shows 
that recent developments in molecular biology are unlocking variable genomic risk 
to diseases and revealing the likely effectiveness of pharmaceutical therapeutic 
interventions.  
 The latest scientific thinking about race has more to do with history than 
biology. Porter points out that ancestry population geneticists are not biological 
essentialists and compares them to historians of sociological activities such as 
migration and mating, and draws on González Burchard on the importance of 
appreciating different layers of complexity, from environmental, historical and 
demographic factors to genetic ancestry.79 This understanding of the centrality of the 
environment returns us to the Victorians who understood the dynamic relations 
between history, environment, and biology. Eliot emphasised that it was 
environment, the various circumstances that grow from the physical geography and 
‘land culture’ of the German peasantry, which gave rise to their ‘numerous specific 
differences in manner and character’ (‘Natural History’, 126). These differences 
acknowledged and expressed the interrelations between the environmental and the 
biological. There is some correlation here with eighteenth-century conceptions of 
race, such as Buffon’s view that race was temporal; it ‘persists as long as the milieu 
remains and disappears when the milieu is changed’80 but Buffon’s work is 
characterised by a sense of racial hierarchy,81 while Eliot and her Victorian 
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contemporaries resisted deterministic thought. 
 Opposed to racial feeling, Hardy urged in 1917 in a letter to the Secretary of 
the Royal Society of Literature that ‘the sentiment of Foreignness [...] attach only to 
other planets and their inhabitants, if any’.82 In his poem ‘The Pity of It’, published 
the same year, he reads race historically, finding kinship between the English and 
Germans through common language. An environmental perspective must open up 
race to social as well as biological influences. Darwin himself observed in the 
Descent that races ‘graduate into each other’; ‘it is hardly possible to discover clear 
distinctive character between them’ (I, 226).  
 Nature in Hardy makes mistakes, unexpectedly and entertainingly. There is 
little deterministic about it, and those who are its familiar inhabitants take note of 
these quirks: 
To people at home there these changeful tricks had their interests; the 
strange mistakes that some of the more sanguine trees had made in 
budding before their month, to be incontinently glued up by frozen 
thawings now; the similar sanguine errors of impulsive birds in framing 
nests that were now swamped by snow-water, and other such incidents, 
prevented any sense of wearisomeness in the minds of the natives.83 
But to the stranger the accidental and impetuous are invisible. The novel brings 
home the reciprocal relations between the natives and their complex, fallible, 
habitat. The unpredictable precludes the reductive and thwarts the deterministic. 
 ‘Proud Songsters’, in Hardy’s last published volume of poetry,84 brings us 
back to the unexplained birds of the Origin of Species. 
The thrushes sing as the sun is going, 
And the finches whistle in ones and pairs, 
And as it gets dark loud nightingales 
In bushes 
Pipe, as they can when April wears, 
As if all Time were theirs. 
  
These are brand new birds of twelvemonths’ growing, 
Which a year ago, or less than twain, 
No finches were, nor nightingales, 
Nor thrushes, 
But only particles of grain, 
And earth, and air, and rain. 
Science, philosophy and poetry combine. Reflection follows observation. The ‘only’ 
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of the penultimate line is belied by the iterative, and elemental, clauses of the last. 
Biology is more than chemistry, and the proud songsters are expressly, and 
inexpressibly, more than the sum of their parts. The transcendental counters the 
reductive; Victorian wonder resists Neo-Darwinian closure. 
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